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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, there were 1,182,000 divorces in 1980, as compared
with 264,000 in 1940.' The change represents a 3.2% increase per one
thousand Americans.2 It is expected that the proportion of divorced
Americans to the general population will continue to increase.3 Much liti1. See THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 907 (1984). The increase in numbers
reflects a percentage change from 2% to 5.2% per 1,000 population. See id at 907; see also
BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 80

(1981) (divorce statistics from 1950 to 1979).
2. See THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 907 (1984); see also BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
MARCH 1982, at 1 (1982) (ratio of divorced persons per 1,000 married persons with spouse
present climbed from 47 to 114 between 1970 and 1982).
3. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PERSPECTIVES ON AMERI-
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gation has resulted from the increase in divorce and from the former
spouses' subsequent attempts to modify custody, alimony, support, or
property issues ostensibly resolved in the divorce decree.' Many divorce
actions today involve a spouse who is not a resident of the state granting
the divorce. This not only results in problems of jurisdiction at the time
of the divorce proceeding, but also gives rise to disputes in later suits for
enforcement or modification of related matters decided in the initial divorce decree.
Consequently, a distinction must be made between divorces involving
one non-resident spouse and those involving spouses who are both residents of the same state.' Although the State of Texas has jurisdiction over
parties who are residents when the proper procedure is followed for service
of process, 8 the procedure for properly invoking the court's jurisdiction
over a non-resident is much more complex. 9 The court's jurisdiction is, in
fact, not simply determined on the basis of procedural rules regarding
service, but is also dependent upon due process considerations and constitutional limitations on long-arm legislation.' °
The purpose of this comment is to examine the evolution of general jurisdictional concepts into what has been described as a "hodge-podge" of

7 (1978) (at least one spouse in 20% of the U.S. marriages
involving husband aged 35-44 has previously experienced divorce). The Census Bureau observes that "the proportion of this group affected by divorce will not decrease but rather can
be expected to increase further over the next several years." Id. at 7.
4. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, at 1 (1979) (statistics regarding child support and alimony). The Census Bureau reports that "three-fifths of the 7.1 million women with children present from an absent
father were awarded or had an agreement to receive child support payments in 1978." Id at
1. The Bureau also reports that "14 % of the 14.3 million ever-divorced or separated women
were awarded or had an agreement to receive alimony or maintenance payments." Id. at 1.
5. See Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, writ dism'd) (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1945)) (state court
has jurisdiction over divorce when one party is domiciled in state though other party is nonresident). See generally Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1824, 1825-29 (1983) (recognizing traditional entrustment of child custody,
divorce, and alimony matters to state courts).
6. See Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and ConservatorshipSuits, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV.
159, 161 (1976).
7. See id at 167-70.
8. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 102 (process may be served anywhere within state); see also id
106 (delineates procedure required for service of citation).
9. See, e.g., id 108 (service on non-resident defendant); id 109 (citation by publication
where personal service unsuccessful); id 109a (different method of substituted service may
be prescribed).
10. See id 108 (explanatory comment reveals purpose of "permit[ting] acquisition of in
personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits").
CAN HUSBANDS AND WIVES
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law relating to divorce and those matters incidental to it." In addition,
this comment will review the current status of divorce jurisdiction in the
State of Texas which is manifested in the long-arm statutes and in the case
law.
II.
A.

GENERAL BACKGROUND ON JURISDICTION LAW

TraditionalJurisdictionAnalysis

Traditional notions of jurisdiction have been based on the legal distinctions between "in personam," "in rem," and "quasi in rem" actions. 2 Historically, "in personam" actions have been defined as those which seek to
adjudicate personal rights of the parties to the action. 3 "In rem" actions
have been those seeking to adjudicate rights to things or the status of parties before the court.' 4 "Quasi in rem" actions have included those which
seek to use the property of specific individuals as the means of bringing
those parties before the court' 5 and have been neither completely "in rem"
I1. See Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and Conservatorship Suits, 8 TEX. TECH L.
159, 161 (1976) (author lists ten treatises and law journal articles summarizing topic).
12. See Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Family Law Litigation, 36
Sw. L.J. 1085, 1087 (1983). Dorsaneo notes that "[s]ince these historical terms, which differentiate one type of jurisdiction from another, will not be abandoned by lawmakers and
cannot be excised neatly from the many places they appear, a present day mastery of the old
vocabulary remains important." Id at 1087-88; see also Kalo, Jurisdictionas an Evolutionary
Process.- The Development of Quasi in Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1147, 1147-48 (historical development of jurisdictional principles parallels changes in society). Kalo theorizes that "[t]he development and evolution of quasi in rem and in personam
jurisdiction principles are in large part a reflection of the constant societal adjustment to the
winds of change which have always swept this country." Id at 1147-48. Because the "winds
of change" are currently bringing with them an increasing number of divorce actions, along
with related matters requiring an understanding of the in rem and in personam concepts,
Mr. Kalo's observation is particularly apt today. See id at 1147-48.
13. See, e.g., Bullock v. Briggs, 623 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, writ
refd n.r.e.) (in personam jurisdiction exists when action is brought seeking judgment against
person properly before the court); Knox v. Quinn, 164 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1942, no writ) (in personam action where personal judgment sought); Lockett v.
Shaw, 106 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1937, no writ) (in personam jurisdiction invoked by party seeking to enforce contract rights); see also Kalo, Jurisdiction as an
Evolutionary Process. The Development of Quasi in Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978
DUKE L.J. 1147, 1148 (historical concept of in personam jurisdiction involved physical presence of defendant before the court).
14. See, e.g., Perry v. Edmonds, 84 P.2d 711, 713 (Nev. 1938) (adjudication of status of
particular thing or subject matter); Gardner v. Union Bank & Trust, 159 S.W.2d 932, 935
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (probate court adjudication of estate
matters deemed in rem); Jones v. Teat, 57 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana)
(solemn declaration of status of person or thing), aff'd on other grounds, 89 S.W.2d 987 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1936, opinion adopted).
15. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (identifying two types of
REV.
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6
nor purely "in personam" in nature.'
Although in personam jurisdiction historically required the physical
presence of the defendant who was arrested and brought before the
court, 17 procedural devices have been developed for providing a symbolic
presence in situations where it is no longer necessary to demand such physical presence.'" Service is regarded as the appropriate mechanism to effect
such jurisdiction over persons when other jurisdictional requirements are
met and also has been the talisman used to invoke the court's jurisdiction
over the non-consenting, non-resident defendant.' 9 In 1878, the United
States Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 20 not only pronounced the necessity for service in invoking a state court's jurisdiction over the person,
but also announced the rules regarding in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction
which were to guide the law in this country for almost a century. 2 ' Under
the holding in Pennoyer, a state court could exert its jurisdiction over the
non-consenting, non-resident defendant by either of two methods.2 2 First,
the court could do so by service of process within its jurisdiction or, sec-

quasi in rem actions). The United States Supreme Court, in Hanson, recognized quasi in
rem jurisdiction in situations where one party seeks to establish a pre-existing claim in certain property and negate the competing claims of other specified persons. See id at 246 n. 12.
The Court also acknowledged quasi in rem jurisdiction in cases in which the plaintiff attempts to have property belonging to the defendant applied in satisfaction of the plaintiffs
claims. See id at 246 n. 12; see also Kalo, Jurisdictionas an Evolutionary Process.- The Development of Quasi in Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1159 (jurisdiction
based on seizure of defendant's property rather than on his physical presence).
16. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (quasi in rem jurisdiction
invoked to determine interests of specified persons in particular property). The Court distinguished quasi in rem from in rem and in personam jurisdiction by providing definitions of
each. See id. at 246 n. 12. An in personam judgment results in a determination of personal
liability of one party for the benefit of another. See id. at 246 n. 12. A judgment in rem
"affects the interests of all persons in designated property." See id at 246 n. 12; see also
Kalo, Jurisdictionas an EvolutionaryProcess. The Development of Quasi in Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1163 n.93. Quasi in rem actions concern property
which is not the subject of controversy and seek to establish the rights of the respective
parties (but not the rights of third parties) to such property. See id. at 1163 n.93.
17. See Lacy, PersonalJurisdictionand Service of Summons after Shaffer v. Heitner, 57
OR. L. REV. 505, 509 (1978). Lacy acknowledges: "The theory was that the court could not
act unless the defendant was literally and physically subject to the power of the court." Id
at 509.
18. See id at 509 (concept of symbolic arrest of defendant through service of process).
19. See Nordenberg, State Courts, PersonalJurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 589 (1979) (service of process required to invoke court's
jurisdiction).
20. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
21. See id. at 733-35; see also Nordenberg, State Courts, PersonalJurisdictionand the
Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 587 (1979) (traditional principles were
major force in American jurisdiction law for nearly a century).
22. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727-28 (1878).
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ond, the court could establish jurisdiction through seizure of the defendant's property located within the state upon the commencement of the
action.2 3 The first method would confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant; the second would establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
party.2 4 Either method could be deemed effective to give a non-resident
defendant adequate notice.25
Although the doctrines of Pennoyer, which have been described as its
"territorial imperative,""26 are no longer wholly intact,227 Pennoyer may
now be viewed historically as having, at an early date, recognized the authority of a state court to alter the civil status of its resident despite the
non-residency of a party to the suit.28 After almost a century of prominence, however, Pennoyer was modified in 1945 by a new mode of analysis
set out in InternationalShoe v. Washington.2 9
B.

Minimum Contacts Doctrine

In InternationalShoe, the United States Supreme Court instituted a
more flexible standard of analysis regarding the question of state court
jurisdiction.3" InternationalShoe required that a non-resident defendant
23. See id at 727-28 (invalid judgment unless property discovered prior to judgment
and was basis for jurisdiction).
24. See id at 727-28.
25. See id at 728.
26. See id at 722 (exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty of state over persons and
property within its boundaries). See generally Ratner, Procedural Due Processand Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. The TerritorialImperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 364 (1980) (state's territorial
imperative required literal or symbolic seizure of persons or property to confer jurisdiction).
27. See Ratner, ProceduralDue Process and Jurisdiction to Adudicate: (a) EffectiveLitigation Values vs. The TerritorialImperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 365 (1980) (territorial imperative vitiated by inherent conflicts
and due process concerns); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1977) (seizure
of property located within forum state no longer adequate to confer jurisdiction over owner).
28. See Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Family Law Litigation, 36
Sw. L.J. 1085, 1091 (1983). Dorsaneo observes that "[s]ince Pennoyer v. Neff, a state court
has been able to determine or alter the marital status of one of its citizens even when the
other party is a non-resident or a citizen of another state." Id at 1091.
29. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (minimum contacts analysis necessary to confer jurisdiction).
30. See Nordenberg, State Courts,PersonalJurisdictionandthe Evolutionary Process,54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 587 (1979). Nordenberg observed the following:
The contributions of International Shoe to the growth of the American law of state
court jurisdiction cannot be seriously questioned. The "minimum contacts" test of InternationalShoe provided for a basic change in legal theory when change was desperately needed. It freed courts from the mechanical inquiries of the past and compelled
their consideration and discussion of factors bearing upon fairness and justice in dealing with jurisdictional problems.
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nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '"31 The "nexus" requirement imposed by the Court
placed greater emphasis on the quality of the required contacts with a forum than on the quantity of such contacts. 32 Subsequent case law applying the minimum contacts doctrine, however, vacillates between a doctrine
that is most concerned with the defendant's contacts with the forum 33 and
one which is most conscious of the connection between the forum and the
cause of action.3 4

C. Modern Jurisdiction Law
Shaffer v. Heitner 3 and Kulko v. Superior Court 36 are two cases evidenc-

ing the modern jurisdiction law. The landmark case of Shaffer essentially
rendered inconsequential the in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem categorizations of legal proceedings for the purpose of due process analysis.37
The United States Supreme Court, under the facts in Kulko, later deemed
a state's interests in adjudication of certain matters as secondary in impor-

Id. at 587.
31. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
32. See id at 316-17 (quality and nature of defendant's activity must be such to make it
fair and reasonable to exercise court's jurisdiction). But see Larsen v. Scholi, 296 N.W.2d
785, 788 (Iowa 1980) (Eighth Circuit places equal emphasis on quantity and quality). The
Larsen court recognized the following three factors which have been identified by Eighth
Circuit courts as most important in applying the minimum contacts standard: "(I) the quantity of the contacts; (2) the nature and quality of the contacts; (3) the source and connection
of the cause of action with those contacts." See id. at 788. The court enumerated two additional factors, but deemed them to be of lesser importance: "(4) the interest of the forum
state; and (5) the convenience of the parties." See id. at 788.
33. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (defendant's minimum contacts
with forum prerequisite to exercise of power over him).
34. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (sufficient for
jurisdiction that contract sued upon had substantial connection with forum).
35. 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977) (minimum contacts analysis extended to quasi in rem
actions). The Court in Shaffer determined that even though the presence within the state of
property unrelated to the cause of action might be indicative of the defendant's contacts with
the forum, the presence of such property would not of itself be a sufficient basis for conferring jurisdiction. See id. at 216.
36. 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (factual analysis required to determine presence of "affiliating circumstances") (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958)).
37. See Note, ConstitutionalLa--DueProcess-Jurisdiction-StateCourt'sExercise of
In Rem or Quasiin Rem JurisdictionMust Satisfy the same "Minimum Contacts" Test that is
Applicable to In PersonamJurisdiction,9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 126, 139, 144 (1977) (all assertions of state court jurisdiction governed by minimum contacts standard); see also Note, The
Constitutionalityof Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner,78 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 421 (1978)
(due process standards same for determining "reasonableness" of jurisdiction whether in
rem or in personam).
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tance to due process considerations which emphasize a defendant's contacts with the forum state. 38 The controversy in Kulko involved an
attempted modification of child custody and support several years subsequent to the divorce of the parents.3 9 The Supreme Court, in its review of
the state court's decision, engaged in a fact-sensitive analysis which recognized that, although the parents had married in the State of California,
they had never lived there during their marriage. 4' The Court noted that it
was only after the Kulko's separation that one of the parties established
residence in California. 4 ' Subsequent to the separation and the granting
of custody to the father, the two children decided to live with the mother in
California. 2 At that time she sought to modify the custody and support
agreement by seeking to invoke the California court's jurisdiction over the
non-resident father.4 3 In its review of the California decision, the Supreme
Court rejected as insufficient the defendant's ties with the forum state and
based its decision upon the tests prescribed in InternationalShoe and its
progeny. 4
There are, ultimately, several general statements regarding jurisdiction
law which can be made. First, the Pennoyerconcept of state court jurisdiction over matters affecting its citizens is still valid as to its requirement of
proper notice to non-resident defendants. 45 Second, the courts consider a

38. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-99, 100 (1978).
39. See id at 86-87.
40. See id at 87.
41. See id at 86-88.
42. See id at 88.
43. See id at 88.
44. See id at 91-92 (evolution of concepts from Pennoyer to InternationalShoe line of
cases prescribes appropriate test). See generally Nordenberg, State Courts, PersonalJurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 621-30 (1979) (analysis of
Kulko as related to minimum contacts doctrine).
45. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (adequate notice must be given defendant); Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121, 1125
(Ohio 1980) ("best possible notice" must be given defendant); Rogers v. Rogers, 441 A.2d
398, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (adequate notice must be given); see also Waldron v. Waldron, 614 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (proper notice through
service of process). The Texas requirement of proper service was stated in Waldron as follows: "[Plersons or property over which the court has potential jurisdiction [must] be
brought before the court by service of process that (1) is consistent with due process and (2)
follows, with reasonable strictness, the procedure designed by the state for notification of the
pending action." Id at 650. But see Lacy, PersonalJurisdiction and Service of Summons
after Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REV. 505, 511 (1978) (service of summons and due process
are unrelated). Mr. Lacy questions the necessity of service of summons as the mandated
means of providing a defendant with notice. See id at 509. He observes that mere compliance with service requirements is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. See id at 510. He also
notes that through the use of the long-arm legislation the defendant need not be within the
forum state for proper service. See id at 509. Thus, he questions whether service compli-
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statutory basis under the laws of the forum state necessary for exercise of
jurisdiction. 6 Third, despite proper notice and a statutory basis for exercise of jurisdiction, such exercise is not valid unless a factual analysis indicates that jurisdiction over the parties comports with the standards of
47
fairness and justice set forth in International Shoe and Kulko.
III.

A.

JURISDICTION IN DIVORCE ACTIONS INVOLVING A NON-RESIDENT

The Divisible Divorce Concept in Theory

The law regarding state jurisdiction in divorce suits involving a nonresident has developed in a parallel fashion to that of jurisdiction law in
general.4a Its development has been equally fraught with confusion in attempts to separate the status (or "in rem") divorce matters from the related
custody and support issues.49 Accordingly, the concept of "divisible divorce" was established by the United States Supreme Court in Estin v.
Estin.50 In Estin, the Court gave effect to a state court's ex parte divorce
52
decree,5 but rendered the decree ineffective as to alimony provisions.
ance actually accomplishes anything useful. See id. at 509. He theorizes that due process
does not require the service of summons because an adequate basis for jurisdiction is not
dependent upon such service, and it is possible to provide fair notice by other means. See id
at 511.
46. See, e.g., Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1980) (statute or rule must
authorize exercise of jurisdiction); Howells v. McKribben, 281 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (Minn.
1979) (jurisdiction depends upon proper statutory authorization); Rogers v. Rogers, 441
A.2d 398, 400 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (long-arm statute of forum must provide statutory basis
for exercise of jurisdiction).
47. See, e.g., Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1980) (exercise ofjurisdiction
must not offend due process principles); Howells v. McKribben, 281 N.W.2d 154, 155-56
(Minn. 1979) (jurisdiction must not offend constitutional principles); Rogers v. Rogers, 441
A.2d 398, 400 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (exercise of jurisdiction must meet constitutional
constraints).
48. See Rymanowoski v. Rymanowoski, 249 A.2d 407, 412 (R.I. 1969) (traditional notions of due process carried into area of domestic relations).
49. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948). The Estin Court stated that:
[aln absolutist might quarrel with the result and demand a rule that once a divorce is
granted, the whole of the marriage relation is dissolved, leaving no roots or tendrils of
any kind. But there are few areas of the law in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are enumerable. For the eternal problem of the
law is one of making accommodations between conflicting interests.
Id at 545. The result to which the Court referred was the invalidation of the part of the
divorce decree which sought to defeat a prior award of alimony. See id at 549.
50. 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
51. See id at 549. In Estin, the non-resident spouse was constructively notified and did
not appear. See id at 541; see also Note, 1947-48 Term of the Supreme Court.- Interstate
Status of Divorce,48 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1087-88 (1948) (ex parte divorce decree valid as
to effect on marital status); Note, Alimony Under SeparationDecree Not Terminatedby Foreign Divorce on Constructive Service, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1947) (foreign divorce
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53
As a consequence, divorce itself maintained its in rem characterization,
but property interests, such as alimony or separate maintenance, were
deemed to require "control or power over the5 4persons whose relationships
are the source of the rights and obligations.
The divisible divorce view of marriage as a "bundle of incidents" thus
separates the issues to be determined by the court into those which are in
rem in nature and those which are in personam in nature." The marital
status itself, as an in rem incident, is generally terminated by a divorce
decree despite the absence of personal jurisdiction over both parties.56
When the divorce decree also seeks to impose personal liability for child
support or alimony in situations where personal jurisdiction is lacking,
however, a subsequent challenge to the decree will render that portion of
the court's pronouncement invalid.5 7 As a result, the parties are left with a
valid dissolution of the marital ties, but no resolution of the other incidents
of the marriage. 8

based on constructive service terminates marriage); Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1233, 1237 (1963) (severance of marriage by ex parte divorce upheld).
52. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948) (court does not have in personam jurisdiction to decide question of alimony where party served by publication and made no appearance); see also Note, Alimony Under Separation Decree Not Terminated by Foreign
Divorce on Constructive Service, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1947) (right to alimony
under earlier decree survives dissolution of marriage); Comment, Support Judgment Survives
Nevada Divorce, 1 STAN. L. REV. 137, 139 (1948) (in personam right to support not altered
by ex parte divorce); Note, Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Domestic Separate
Maintenance Decree Survives Foreign Divorce, 2 VAND. L. REV. 109, 109 (1948) (prior judicial determination of husband's personal liability for alimony survives ex parte divorce termination of marital status).
53. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1942) (recognition of divorce
as a status proceeding).
54. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948).
55. See Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (1963) (marriage as "bundle of incidents").
56. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) (marital capacity changed); see also
Comment, Support Judgment Survives Nevada Divorce, 1 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (1948) (decree altered marital status).
57. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) (other legal incidents of marriage not
necessarily changed by divorce decree); see also Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1233, 1239-40 (1963) (states reluctant to alter support obligations).
58. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Schroeder, 430 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (ex
parte foreign divorce deemed valid as to status determination but ineffective as to alimony
matters); Lewis v. Lewis, 404 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (La. 1981) (valid divorce as to marital status
but invalid as to alimony and child support); Simpson v. O'Donnell, 654 P.2d 1020, 1021
(Nev. 1982) (severance of marital ties despite court's inability to adjudicate custody, child
support, and alimony rights).
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B. The Divisible Divorce Concept in Practice
The law subsequent to Estin has reaffirmed the in rem "status" categorization of the divorce action itself.5 9 In doing so, divorce law has adhered
to the historical pronouncements of Pennoyer, which recognize a state's
interest in determining the status of a resident.6 ° In Shaffer, the Supreme
Court recognized the need for special treatment of divorce actions6' and
thereby made an exception to its general rule of abolishing the distinctions
between in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem jurisdiction.6 2 The Shaffer
exception is applicable if two requirements are met.63 First, there must be
a "status adjudication"; second, there must be "particularized jurisdictional rules applicable to the proceedings."'
Shaffer, however, still requires that all exercises of state court jurisdiction are subject to the
standards of fair play set out in InternationalShoe.6 5
59. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(change of marital status regarded as in rem proceeding); Phelan v. Phelan, 443 A.2d 1259,
1262 (R.I. 1982) (in rem termination of marital status upheld); Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407,
410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (dissolution of marital relationship under in rem
proceeding).
60. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878); see also Phelan v. Phelan, 443 A.2d
1259, 1262 (R.I. 1982) (reliance upon "due-process considerations first announced in Pennoyer"), Butler v. Butler, 577 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ
dism'd) (state court has jurisdiction over marital status of its citizens); Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ dism'd) (domicile creates sufficient relationship for state to exercise power). See generally Comment, Jurisdiction
Over the Non-Resident Parent in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, 34 BAYLOR L.
REV. 107, 107-10 (1982) (noting Pennoyer recognition of state jurisdiction in matters involving personal status despite inability to serve defendant within the state).
61. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977) (citing Pennoyeraccommodation of
actions involving personal status through adjudication in plaintiff's home state despite inability to serve the defendant within that forum); see also Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme,
Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.D. L. REV.
229, 240 (1979) (citing recognition in Shaffer of divorce as status proceeding and noting two
requirements for application of Shaffer exception); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1245 (1980) (concluding on basis of Shaffer
exception for status adjudication that "established jurisdictional principles" remain
unchanged).
62. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977) (recognition of status adjudications); see also Developments in the LaK--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1245 (1980) (established jurisdictional rules for dissolving marriages remain
intact).
63. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption
After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 229, 240 (1979) (requirements for exception
enumerated).
64. See id at 240.
65. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (quasi in rem jurisdiction
subject to minimum contacts analysis); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (minimum contacts required so as not to offend "traditional notions of fair play
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C. JurisdictionLaw in Texas
1. Texas Approach to Jurisdiction in General
Texas courts have attempted.to adopt a more explicit test than that originally pronounced in InternationalShoe.66 Texas adopted a minimum contacts-due process analysis in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.,67 which imposes a
tripartite test for determining whether a state court may properly exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident.68 First, the test seeks to determine
whether the defendant has engaged in a purposeful act or transaction
within the state.69 Second, it requires that the cause of action result from
the defendant's activity within the state.70 Third, the test imposes the standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""1 The
tripartite test of O'Brien still appears to be the predominant form of analysis in Texas.72
and substantial justice"); Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases, 32
Sw. L.J. 965, 968-70 (1978) (quasi in rem jurisdiction unavailable to seize property of nonresident spouse after Shaffer).
66. See O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966) (three-prong test specified for minimum contacts determination) (citing Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prod.,
Inc., 381 P.2d 245, 251 (Wash. 1963)); Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d
434, 436 (Tex. 1982) (application of O'Brien three-prong test).
67. 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966).
68. See id at 342. In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a
minimum contacts analysis composed of two parts. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). "First, there must be some minimum contact with the
state which results from an affirmative act of the defendant. Secondly, it must be fair and
reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and defend the action." Id at
494.
69. See O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966). O'Brienrequires that
"the non-resident defendant. . . must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state." Id.at 342.
70. See id at 342. The court stated that "the cause of action must arise from, or be
connected with, such act or transaction." Id.at 342.
71. See id at 342. O'Brien provides that "the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum
state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id at 342. As
a part of the third component of the test, the court enumerated specific considerations which
provide guidance in applying the test. See id at 342. Consideration is "given to the quality,
nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties,
the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and
the basic equities of the situation." Id at 342.
72. See generally Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex.
1982) (returning to O'Brien test). But see Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982) ("Helicol" court dismisses second prong of O'Brien
test and allows non-resident plaintiffs to recover from foreign corporation), rev'd, U.S. 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1984). The court allowed recovery on the basis of jurisdicat 872; see also TEx.
tional powers under the Texas long-arm statute, article 203 lb. See id.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (jurisdiction extended over nonresidents doing business in Texas). Although the decision of the Texas Supreme Court
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Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction Over a Non-Resident

Despite the protections offered by the due process standard of fairness,
the difficulties resulting from application of the "divisible divorce" concept" remain and have made the attainment of personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident spouse desirable.7 4 Four reasons have been advanced to
support the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident spouse
in a divorce proceeding." One concern has been the possibility of collateral attack on the determination of domicile made by the divorce court,
which, if successful, would invalidate the divorce decree. 76 A second concern has been the unenforceability of money judgments against the nonresident spouse in the absence of personal jurisdiction.7 7 The third reason

would seem to negate the uniform mandatory application of all three parts of the O'Brien
test, the Helicolanalysis appears to be confined to its facts, particularly in light of reversal by
the United States Supreme Court. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
U.S. - 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (1984); see also Note, The Expansion
of Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Texas. Hall v. HelicopterosNacionalesde Colombia,S.A., 36 Sw.
L.J. 1197, 1208-11 (1983) (prospects increased for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations by Helicol). Shortly after its decision in Helicol,the Texas Supreme Court returned
to the tripartite test in Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 436 (1982).
In doing so, the court made no reference to the Helicol deviation. See Note, The Expansion
ofLong-Arm Jurisdictionin Texas: Hall v. HelicopterosNacionalesde Colombia, S.A., 36 Sw.
L.J. 1197, 1211 n.123 (1983) (no reconciliation of Helicol and Siskind by court). For a discussion of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Helicol,see generally Note, Civil Procedure-In PersonamJurisdiction-InPersonamJurisdictionMay Be Exercised Over A Foreign
Corporation Which Has Engaged In Continuous and Substantial Business Transactions in
Texas For Causes of Action Unrelatedto Those Transactions,14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 79, 91-93
(1982).
73. See, e.g., Butler v. Butler, 577 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978,
writ dism'd) (divorce challenged where court did not exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident); Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (appeal of
divorce terminating marital relationship under in rem proceeding); Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ dism'd) (bill of review
sought to set aside divorce judgment).
74. See, e.g., Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6, 8-9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980,
no writ) (divorce valid where no jurisdiction over question of child conservatorship because
minimum contacts not satisfied); Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, no writ) (in absence of in personam jurisdiction court granted valid divorce but could
not adjudicate matters involving "personal obligations"); Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J. 965, 967-73 (1978) (discussing reasons why personal
jurisdiction desirable).
75. See Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J. 965,
967-73 (1978).
76. See id at 967-68 (jurisdiction on basis of domicile of spouse may be collaterally
attacked by spouse in absence of personal jurisdiction); cf. Ex parte Limoges, 526 S.W.2d
707, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ) (successful collateral attack against court's
jurisdiction to impose child support obligation where personal jurisdiction absent).
77. See Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases,32 Sw. L.J. 965,
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advanced for the desirability of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident is concern with difficulties arising from the divisible divorce
concept and application of the "last in time" rule where two divorce decrees have been rendered.7" The final argument in favor of acquisition of
personal jurisdiction is the reluctance of courts to modify custody decrees
and the constitutional issues involved in according such decrees full faith
and credit.7 9
Today, in the State of Texas, there is a more pressing fifth reason to
acquire personal jurisdiction in divorce actions. An analysis of recent
Texas cases indicates that the severance of the marital ties, although an in
rem proceeding, may not always survive a subsequent challenge based on
failure of the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the parties.8 °
3. Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction Legislation
While Texas still adheres to the concept of divisible divorce whereby a
valid divorce may be rendered in absence of personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident defendant, the Texas Family Code does facilitate obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident spouse in divorce proceed-

968-71 (1978) (money judgments for support, costs, attorney's fees, and child support require
personal jurisdiction).
78. See id at 971-72 ("divisible divorce" doctrine and "last in time" rules make personal jurisdiction desirable). Weintraub identifies the problems encountered in attempting
to resolve disputes related to support under the divisible divorce concept. See id at 971. He
also notes the "apparent anomaly" of the last in time rule which departs from the general
full faith and credit doctrines that require one forum to accord "full faith and credit" to a
valid divorce decree of another forum. See id at 971. Under the last in time rule, where one
state has failed to accord the other the full faith and credit which it is due, but has instead
rendered a second divorce decree involving the same parties, the second decree is given
effect in both jurisdictions. See id. at 971; cf. Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faithand Credit,
and Famiy Law Litigation, 36 Sw. L.J. 1085, 1129-31 (1983) (recognition of due process and
other limits on full faith and credit).
79. See Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases,32 Sw. L.J. 965,
972-73 (1978) (questioning application of full faith and credit doctrine in area of custody).
Weintraub cites May v. Anderson in questioning whether a state court can defer to another
state's custody determination and require that a parent who had not been subject to the
latter's personal jurisdiction nonetheless go to that forum for any desired modification. See
id at 972-73 (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)); see also Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (doctrine requires state to accord another forum's judgment the res
judicata effect it would have in such forum); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit
clause).
80. CompareConlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1983) (divorce decree valid
to sever marital ties despite absence of statute or rule authorizing personal jurisdiction) with
Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd) (divorce
decree rendered invalid by failure to obtain personal jurisdiction through proper service of
process).
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ings. l Section 3.26 provides for adjudication of actions regarding the
marital status of a petitioner who is a resident or domiciliary of the state at
the time the action is filed.8 2 It subjects the respondent or his personal
representative to the personal jurisdiction of the state courts even though
he is a nonresident or nondomiciliary if either of two conditions is met. 3
First, Texas must be the last state of marital cohabitation and the suit must
be commenced within two years after such cohabitation ended.8 4 Alternatively, there may be any basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction as
There is an
long as it conforms with the state or federal constitution.
"inherent tension" between the more specific requirements and the general
86
provision which purports to extend jurisdiction to constitutional limits.
The general requirement is vague, however, and has not been relied upon
in case law to broaden the state's scope of jurisdiction beyond the minimum contacts otherwise specified by the statute and in O'Brien.s7
Although section 3.26 was enacted in 1975, two years prior to Shaffer, it
actually seems to go beyond the requirements imposed by Shaffer.8 In
creating section 3.26, the 64th Legislature enacted a long-arm statute based
on an identification of minimum contacts which the respondent may have
with the State of Texas.8 9 Whereas Shaffer has exempted status adjudications from strict compliance with the minimum contacts analysis and requires only that such adjudications be based on a standard of fairness,9"
the Texas Family Code provision imposes a minimum contact analysis
81. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id
85. See id
86. See Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and Conservatorship Suits, 8 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 159, 197 (1976) (reconciliation of general and specific provisions difficult).
87. See, e.g., Cossey v. Cossey, 602 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no
writ) (no abuse of discretion where court refused jurisdiction though § 3.26 provisions met);
Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407,409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (finding assertion of
in personam jurisdiction by lower court wrongful where no contacts with the state); Dorsaneo, Due Process,Full Faith and Credit, andFamily Law Litigation, 36 Sw. L.J. 1085, 1107
(1983) (Fox court found no basis for jurisdiction consistent with due process despite failure
to expressly construe general requirement of § 3.26).
88. Cf. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption
After Shaffer andKulko, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 229, 230 (1979) (Shaffer recognized status exception to general rule requiring minimum contacts of defendant with forum).
89. See McKnight, Commentary on Title 1, Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement,
8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 10 (1976). Mr. McKnight observed: "This section provides for an
extension of personal jurisdiction by way of minimum contacts of the respondent with the
state of Texas in relation to obligations of the respondent incurred here to allow the courts of
this state to enforce those obligations." Id at 10.
90. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977) (rules governing adjudication
of status subject to standard of fairness).
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which can only be dispensed with if there is another basis consistent with
the Texas or United States constitutional requirements of due process. 9'
4. Three Components of Personal Jurisdiction
Despite the availability of such long-arm legislation, the attainment of
personal jurisdiction is not assured by mere compliance with its require-

ments 92 of the requisite minimum contacts or a basis consistent with the

state or federal constitution. 93 The assertion of personal jurisdiction requires both enabling legislation and a mechanism for giving adequate notice.94 The statutory authority needed to confer personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident respondent is dependent upon the mechanisms provided in
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service of process. 95 Furthermore, service of process must meet with the requisite formalities for
giving adequate notice to the respondent, 96 or a judgment may not be
had. 97
a.

Enabling Legislation

The enabling legislation required to obtain personal jurisdiction is provided by sections 3.26 and 11.051 of the Texas Family Code and the
91. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
92. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.52-.53 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (requirements for
service of process); McKnight, Commentary on Title 1, Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 11 (1976) (service of process or citation by publication
required); Kronzer, In Personam Jurisdictionand Due Processof Law-Problems andDevelopments, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PROCEDURE A-26 (1981) (divorce and family law suits
require personal service or permissible substitute).
93. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
94. See Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1975) (approving extraterritorial service of process and observing deficiency in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)).
In Mitchim, the Texas Supreme Court observed that "[tihe Wisconsin statute authorizing
extraterritorial service of process did not purport to confer personal jurisdiction over the
party thus served." Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1975).
95. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.52-.53 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (formal notice
requirements necessary); McKnight, Commentary on Title 1, Texas Family Code Symposium
Supplement, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 11 (1976) (two acceptable methods of formal notice
specified); Kronzer, In Personam Jurisdictionand Due Processof Law-Problems andDevelopments, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PROCEDURE A-26 (1981) (personal or substituted service
mandated in family law suits).
96. See, e.g., Scucchi v. Woodruff, 503 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973, no writ) (requirement of notice by prescribed method followed with reasonable strictness); City of Corpus Christi v. Scruggs, 89 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio
1935, no writ) (no personal jurisdiction in absence of strict compliance); Kimmell v. Edwards, 193 S.W. 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917, no writ) (statutory requirements regarding citation and service must be strictly followed). But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 124
(waiver of process or appearance by respondent may waive notice requirement).
97. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 124 (requirements for judgment).
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amended rule 108.98 Although the enabling legislation requires the acquisition of personal jurisdiction, its absence has not been deemed fatal to the
adjudication of marital status.99 In Conlon v. Heckler, °° the Social Security Administration refused to recognize a Dallas County divorce decree,
which purported to sever marital ties between Judy and Michael Conlon as
well as establish Michael's paternity of Judy's daughter, Trisha.' 0 '
Michael had been personally served with process in Vermont pursuant to
the divorce action instituted in Texas by Judy. 10 2 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, applying Texas law, determined that although Michael had
been personally served, there was no long-arm provision at the time to
confer personal jurisdiction on the court. 103 The court upheld the divorce
decree as it purported to sever the marital relationship between the parties. " It refused, however, to recognize the divorce court's determination
0 5
of the paternity issue in the absence of personal jurisdiction.'
Conlon serves as both an illustration of the necessity of enabling legislation for purposes of conferring personal jurisdiction and of the
"survivability" of the divorce itself despite the absence of such personal
jurisdiction.0 6 The Conlon case remains a vivid illustration of a category
of cases wherein the lack of personal jurisdiction has not been deemed
fatal to the adjudication of marital status. 0 7
98. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (long-arm provision for
acquiring jurisdiction over non-residents in divorce actions); id § 11.051 (Vernon Supp.
1984) (long-arm provision regarding jurisdiction of non-residents in matters affecting the
parent-child relationship); Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ch. 160, §§ 1-12, 1983
Tex. Gen. Laws 691 (amendment to Family Code); TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 (extending acquisition of in personam jurisdiction to constitutional limits).
99. See Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 1983) (no enabling long-arm
statute available).
100. 719 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1983).
101. Seeid at 792. There was a question as to whether a common law marital relationship actually existed, but the divorce was granted nonetheless. See id. at 792 n.2.
102. See Conlon v. Schweiker, 537 F. Supp. 158, 162 (N.D. Tex. 1982), affd sub nom.
Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1983).
103. See Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 1983). Service had been in
compliance with rule 108 prior to the 1976 amendment which extended its scope. See id at
794; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 108. See generally Bishop, InternationalLitigation in Texas:
Service ofProcess andJurisdiction,35 Sw. L.J. 1013, 1026 (1982) (post-1976 version of rule
expands scope of rule to constitutional limits of due process). Neither was there a grant of
power under article 203 1b, as it is not applicable to paternity suits. See Conlon v. Heckler,
719 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 549 S.W.2d
442, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ)).
104. See Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1983) (dissolution of marital
relationship valid despite failure to obtain personal jurisdiction).
105. See id. at 798.
106. See id at 795-98.
107. See id. at 795; see also Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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b. Minimum Contacts
A closer look at the Texas courts' treatment of status adjudication
reveals that personal jurisdiction may also fail due to factual circumstances
which do not satisfy the requisite minimum contacts.10 8 The courts have
combined the requirements specified in section 3.26 with the O'Brien
test' 9 and the "affirmative act" requirements of Kulko in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over matters relating to custody and child support." 0
Failure to meet such requirements, however, will not invalidate the portion of a divorce decree which severs the marital ties, as illustrated in
Comisky v. Comisky. "' In Comisky, a Texas appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court which granted a divorce from a non-resident
wife, recognizing it as an in rem proceeding.' 12 It did so while declaring
that the lower court's assumption of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse offended "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" according to the tenets of InternationalShoe and O'Brien." 3 The
appellate court also sought to apply the standards of section 3.26, but was
unable to do so due to an inadequate statement of facts." 4 Consequently,
the court was unable to satisfy the requisites for personal jurisdiction, but
upheld the divorce decree nonetheless.' '5 A similar result was reached in

Beaumont 1980, no writ) (divorce upheld despite lack of personal jurisdiction); Fox v. Fox,
559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (severance of marital ties successful in absence of in personam jurisdiction); Risch v. Risch, 395 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ dism'd) (divorce affirmed despite absence of personal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1967).
108. See Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no
writ) (facts do not meet requisites for minimum contacts with forum).
109. See Cossey v. Cossey, 602 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ)
(refusal to exercise jurisdiction due to insufficient basis, per O'Brien, to adjudicate child
custody dispute).
110. See Bergdoll v. Whitley, 598 S.W.2d 932, 935-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no
writ) (no affirmative act taken by non-resident defendant to justify exercise of in personam
jurisdiction).
I 11. See Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no
writ) ("factual context" indicates lack of minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction,
but divorce upheld); see also Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977,
no writ) (status adjudication upheld where minimum contacts not satisfied for in personam
jurisdiction); Risch v. Risch, 395 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ
dism'd) (divorce affirmed despite absence of minimum contacts to support in personam jurisdiction), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10 (1967).
112. See Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no
writ) (severence of marital ties affirmed despite factual context insufficient to support finding
of minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction).
113. See id at 9.
114. See id. at 7-9.
115. See id at 9.
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the case of Fox v. Fox, 1 6 where a Texas appellate court again affirmed a
marriage dissolution, but deemed the trial court incapable of resolving the
bematters requiring personal jurisdiction where the necessary contacts
17
tween the non-resident spouse and the state were not present."
Minimum contacts analysis in future cases will be affected by the recent
Texas adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA)," which shifts the focus of analysis from the parents to the
child and eliminates the requirement of personal jurisdiction over both
parents for adjudication of custody matters.' 19 The necessity of personal
jurisdiction in other divorce-related matters is otherwise recognized by
current judicial authority, 2 0 which continues to uphold the dissolution of
marital ties despite2 1the absence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the state.'
c.

Proper Method of Providing Adequate Notice

The issue of notice to a non-resident spouse has been the subject of
much debate in recent years.122 Although the defendant may have actual
notice when he becomes aware of the suit through any means, actual notice has not been deemed adequate in Texas. 123 Consequently, the rules of
make it possible to acquire
procedure provide several mechanisms which
124
personal jurisdiction over non-residents.
116. 559 S.W.2d 407,410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (marriage dissolution
valid despite absence of minimum contacts necessary to invoke in personam jurisdiction of
court).
117. See idat 409-10.
118. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-11.75 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984).
119. See id § 11.53.; see also Sampson & Tindall, The UCCJ4 Comes to Texas-As
Amended, Integratedand Improved, 46 TEX. B.J. 1096, 1104 n.69 (1983) (in personam jurisdiction over both parents not required for adjudication of child custody).
120. See Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (divorce decree rendered
in absence of personal jurisdiction not conclusive as to all incidents of marriage).
121. See Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Family Law Litigation, 36
Sw. L.J. 1085, 1105 (1983) (divisible divorce concept in Texas).
122. See, e.g., Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1975) (recognizing use of
extraterritorial service of process on individuals); Bishop, InternationalLitigation in Texas:
Service of ProcessandJurisdiction,35 Sw. L.J. 1013, 1025-28 (1982) (attempting to reconcile
Rule 108 and long-arm legislative provisions for personal jurisdiction); Dorsaneo, Jurisdiction Over The Person And Service Of Process, ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL COURSE K-43-44
(1982) (distinguishing long-arm statutes from Rule 108).
123. See, e.g., Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd) (actual notice not sufficient); Shanbaum v. Janssen, 582 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (court's jurisdiction not invoked by actual notice); Clayton v.
Newton, 524 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (actual notice
insufficient).
124. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.521 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (citation by publica-
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The failure to give notice as specifically required by rules of procedure
has been deemed fatal by Texas courts.'25 In Heth v. Heth,'2 6 service of
citation in a Texas divorce action was attempted on Nancy Heth at her
residence in Connecticut. 27 Despite the fact that there had been no motion for substitute service, a copy of the petition was left with Nancy's
eighteen-year-old daughter. 128 Thereafter, the Texas court entered a decree severing the marital ties and imposing child support obligations on
James Heth. 129 Nancy Heth appealed, complaining of the lack of jurisdiction of the divorce court.'" ° The court of appeals found that the Texas
divorce court was "without power to act even with respect to the in rem
aspects of the divorce" due to a failure to serve Nancy personally as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.' 3 ' The decision in Heth
brings to the forefront the importance of utilizing the proper procedural
132
mechanisms for adequate notice.
As noted in 1eth, it is the proper use of the appropriate mechanisms for
tion in divorce cases); TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 (personal service on non-resident); id 109a (substitute service provision).
125. See Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd)
(neither in personam nor in rem jurisdiction invoked where failure to use proper procedure
for adequate notice).
126. 661 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
127. See id at 303.
128. See id at 303. Although Nancy made a special appearance and a plea to the
jurisdiction which the court sustained, James Heth proceeded with the Texas divorce action,
making no further attempt at personal service. See id at 303. He later contended that there
was actual notice to Nancy by service upon her daughter, and that she acknowledged such
notice by her special appearance in Texas. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Heth v. Heth, 661
S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
129. See Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd).
130. See id. at 305. Shortly thereafter and prior to the Texas court of appeals decision
in the matter, Nancy Heth was granted a Connecticut decree which also purported to grant a
divorce. See Letter Brief for Appellant at I, Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, writ dism'd). The Connecticut decree also purportedly disposed of all property,
custody, and support issues. See Record at 8-12, Heth v. Heth, No. 28-02-86 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Aug. 2, 1983). The Texas court of appeals, without mention of the Connecticut decree,
declared the Texas decree entirely void. See Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
131. See Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd)
(court order for substituted service required in absence of personal service).
132. See id at 305; see also In re Marriage of Peace, 631 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1982, no writ) (new divorce trial granted where no diligent effort made to determine non-resident's whereabouts prior to service by publication); Waldron v. Waldron, 614
S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (divorce decree invalid where
procedure for notification not followed with reasonable strictness); Johnston v. Johnston,
575 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ) (defective return to service on default judgment renders divorce decree invalid).
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notice, and not the notice itself, that has been deemed indispensible.' 33
Although one commentator has questioned the continuing validity of requiring strict compliance with rules regarding service of summons,134 the
courts are reluctant to take35such a liberal view in the absence of statutory
justification for so doing.1
Lack of personal jurisdiction as a result of failure to follow the appropriate notice requirements will result in the invalidation of both the in rem
adjudication of marital status and the in personam adjudication of related
matters, although such lack of jurisdiction due to other deficiencies will
not render the divorce itself invalid. 136 The significance of proper service
of process has been recently emphasized by the state's non-uniform adoption of the UCCJA.137 Although Texas has dispensed with the require-

133. See Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd)
(actual notice not sufficient to "activate the potential jurisdictional powers" of court); Grasz
v. Grasz, 608 S.W.2d 356, 357-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (notice not synonymous with formal citation and inadequate to require appearance and answer); Clayton v.
Newton, 524 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (compliance with
rule necessary as actual knowledge does not bring party into court); Scucchi v. Woodruff,
503 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ) (method prescribed for
giving notice exclusive and must be followed with "reasonable strictness").
134. See Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Summons after Shaffer v. Heitner, 57
OR. L. REV. 505, 508-11 (1978) (service of summons not required by due process). Mr. Lacy
cites Shaffer for the proposition that service of summons within a jurisdiction is not sufficient
to confer jurisdiction over a defendant who may be "found" within the state. See id at 509.
He also notes that service within a state is no longer necessary due to the adoption of longarm statutes conferring jurisdiction. See id at 509. The question then becomes whether
service of summons bears any relation to jurisdiction, and he determines that it does not.
See id. at 509. It is on this basis that he questions the justification for requiring strict compliance with "formalities of issuing and serving summons." See id. at 509.
135. Compare Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd) (proper service of process required) with Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (service of process unnecessary in child custody determination under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act where reasonable notice given). It must
be noted that the decision in Perry was prior to the adoption in Texas of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and was a suggestion that Texas courts adopt the principles of the Act. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ). The UCCJA has since been adopted by the Texas legislature and became effective on
September 1, 1983. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-11.75 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp.
1984). There is, however, a non-uniform provision in the Act, as adopted in Texas, which
requires conformity with Texas law regarding service and answer. See id § 11.55.
136. Compare Heth v. Heth, 661 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd) (improper service renders all aspects of divorce decree invalid) with Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 1983) (divorce decree valid in absence of personal jurisdiction due to lack of enabling legislation).
137. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.55 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984); see also Sampson & Tindall, The UCCIA Comes to Texas-As Amended, Integrated and Improved 46
TEX. B.J. 1096, 1104 (1983) (describing provisions of UCCJA as adopted in Texas).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss1/5

20

Specht: State Jurisdiction in Divorce Actions Involving a Non-Resident Sp

COMMENT

1984]

ment of personal jurisdiction in adjudication of custody disputes, it has
altered the uniform law by engrafting a requirement of proper service of
process.' 38 Service, therefore, is still deemed necessary in a status adjudication even though personal jurisdiction may not be required.' 3 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

The divisible divorce concept rests on the premise that personal jurisdiction is not necessary for the in rem adjudication of divorce, allowing the
divorce to survive where personal jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. Although personal jurisdiction may be lacking due to an inadequate legislative grant of power to confer jurisdiction or due to lack of the
requisite minimum contacts with the forum, the in rem divorce is deemed
to be valid. The courts have, however, identified one exception wherein
the divorce does not survive. That exception arises when the formal procedures for notice have not been strictly followed.
Although the Texas legislature has provided family law practitioners
with ample long-arm provisions regarding divorce and the parent-child relationship,"4° the Texas legal practitioner must be aware of the necessity of
strict compliance with procedural mechanisms to invoke the court's jurisdiction properly. 14 ' Unless the courts become more liberal in their requirements of strict compliance with the rules regarding service of
summons or the legislature makes statutory provisions dispensing with formalities of notice, an unwary practitioner may find that, not only has he
failed to protect his client's interests in the areas requiring personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, but that he has procured an invalid divorce
decree for his client.

138. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.55 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984). The non-uniform UCCJA amendment to § 11.55 of the Texas Family Code provides for notice to a nonresident in a "manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice," but mandates that it be in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or with the law of the place where
service is to be made. See id § 11.55. As of this writing, there are no Texas cases construing
the UCCJA.
139. See id. at 695.
140. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (long-arm provisions for
divorce); id § 3.521 (provision for citation by publication); id § 11.051 (long-arm provisions
for parent-child relationship); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-11.75 (Vernon Pamphlet

Supp. 1984) (Texas adoption of UCCJA).
141. See, e.g., TEX. R. Clv. P. 108 (long-arm provision extending personal jurisdiction
to constitutional limits); id 109 (citation by publication where personal service unsuccessful); id. 109a (different method of substituted service may be prescribed).
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